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Abstract 
We consider the effects of admitting immigrants with the burden of giving 
schooling to the native and the immigrant children. It may sound 
paradoxical; this model shows admitting immigrants may improve the 
welfare of the native when the necessary number of educators the 
immigrant children need is sufficiently high. What is more, admitting 
immigrants also improves the employment rate of the native. 
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IOM (2019) says that the number of international migrants is estimated to be almost 272 
million globally, which is about 3.5% of the world’s population. This average figure 
remains a very small percentage, but the distribution of international migrants is different 
from country to country and region to region.  
IOM (2019) also shows that shares of international migrants in 2019 were highest in 
Oceania, North America, and Europe, respectively, 21 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per 
cent of the total population and that Asia experience the most remarkable growth from 
2000 to 2019, at 69 per cent (around 34 million people in absolute terms). These current 
situations implies that international migrants play the important role in the advanced 
countries mainly. In this paper, we focus on the effects of admitting international 
immigrants on the host country. 
   The model in this paper considers the effects of admitting immigrants on the native 
welfare paying attention to the schooling burden. In the literature, there are so many 
papers considering the effect of admitting immigrants on accumulation of the native 
human capital through education system or on the wages, the unemployment through the 
labor market. 
Recently, Basten (2019), Fulanetto and Robstad (2019), and Esposito, Collignon, and 
Scicchitano (2020) and so on show that there are positive effects of admitting 
international immigrants on the employment rate of the native1.  
   On the effects of admitting immigrants on education, for example, Speciale (2012) 
considers the impact of immigration on public education expenditures in EU-15 countries, 
which shows an increase in foreign population is found to have a small negative effect on 
public education expenditures. On the other hand, Mavisakalyan (2011) shows an 
increase in the share of immigrant population raises private school enrollment across 
countries by leading to a decrease in the share of public education spending with an 
instrument constructed from gravity model estimates. Hunt (2017) also examines the 
impact of immigration the high school completion of natives in the United States and 
shows a positive net effect. 
Albornoz et al. (2018 takes it o consideration structure of education where student 
effort and talent interact with parental and teachers’ investments as well as school system 
resources. Albornoz, et al. (2018) find that immigrant children perform better if their 
parents faced higher emigration costs. However, they do not consider the burden of 
 
1 On the other hand, Borjas (2003), Edo (2017), and Dustmann et al (2017) and so on show there are 
negative effects of admitting immigrants on the employment rate of the native. 
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schooling like financing wages of educators as well as a decrease in the labor force caused 
by an additional increase in the number of educators caused by admitting immigrants. 
This paper makes it clear that why admitting immigrants improves not only the 
employment of the native by considering the schooling burden but also the welfare of the 
native when the burden of schooling is sufficiently heavy, which may sound paradoxical. 
   This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model and the final section 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. The model 
An overlapping generations model is applied, where individuals live for three periods: 
the childhood, the working, and the retirement period. Children need someone who 
educate and rear themselves, (educator). Individuals in the working period is endowed 
with one unit of labour which is inelastically supplied to consumption firm or education 
sector if they are employed. If unemployed, individuals receive an unemployment benefit. 
According to the expected income, individuals decide the amount of consumption, saving 
and the number of children. When old, he/she is retired. To investigate the effects of 
admitting immigrants through the education system on the social welfare for the native, 
we do not consider the pension system. 
 
2.1 Immigration 
In period zero, working immigrants, 𝜆𝜆 rate of the native working people, enter the 
country without capital2. 𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝝀𝝀𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 (1) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼: the number of immigrants in period t and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁: the number of the native 
working people in period t. The superscript 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is used to denote immigrants and 𝑁𝑁 is 
used to denote native residents. Thus, the population of t-th generation including the 
immigrant becomes 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = (1 + 𝜆𝜆)𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁.  
Immigrants in the working period need to spend a certain unit �𝜌𝜌 ∈ (0, 1)� of labour 
time to adjust themselves to the host country. The endowment of time for immigrant 
entering the host country becomes less than one unit. Ρ ≡ (1 − 𝜌𝜌) is the workable time.  
    
 
2 Like Razin and Sadka (2000), Kemnitz (2003), Jinno (2011) and so on, we should consider the 
distribution in the skill level. Muysken et al. (2015) also shows medium-skill immigration decreases low-
skilled unemployment under the flexible regime with general equilibrium framework considered. However, 
this paper does not pay attention to this point because we would like to consider the burden of schooling 
clearly and for simplicity of calculation. 
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2.2 Child-Rearing and Education 
Native (immigrant) children need a certain number of educators to be reared and educated, ℎ𝑁𝑁 (ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). Children of immigrant also need a certain extra number of people who bring 
up and educate themselves more than the native need. The relationship between the 
numbers of educators per native and immigrant children becomes  𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵 < 𝒉𝒉𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝒒𝒒𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵, (2) 
where 𝑞𝑞 > 1. The total number of educators the native and the immigrant children need 
in the period t, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡, becomes 𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕 = 𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒉𝒉𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰, (3) 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 (𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is the number of children per the native (the immigrant).  
Thanks to additional educators, they can fully exert their abilities as well as the natives 
when being adult3. For simplicity, the children of immigrant become the native in the t+1 
period. Thus, the transition of the population of generation including the immigrant 
becomes 𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵 = 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰. (4) 
 
2.3 Labor market 
There are two labor market, consumption sector and education sector. For simplicity, the 
native as well as the immigrant workers in the consumption sector face the common 
unemployment rate, 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬 = 𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 (5) 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸: the ratio of unemployed workers to employed workers, 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋: the number of 
unemployed workers attributed to 𝑋𝑋 ∈ (𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) , and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋 : the number of employed 
workers attributed to 𝑋𝑋 . The superscript E is used to denote the variable is common 
among the native and the immigrant. The ratio of the employed to the population of t-th 
generation attributed to 𝑋𝑋 is 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = 𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 . (6) 
Using equation (1), (5) and (6), the number of unemployed native (immigrant) workers 
becomes 𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵, (7 − 𝑎𝑎) 
 
3 This is a very strong assumption. PISA (2018) shows the scores of immigrant children are less than those 
of the natives, even though they receive some additional more support from educators than native children 
do in some host countries. Thus, when this strong assumption is relaxed, the results of this paper may 




            = 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝝀𝝀𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵. (7 − 𝑏𝑏) 
   In the education sector, only the native are employed because they have to bring up 
and educate the immigrant children as well as the native children to learn not only the 
host language, culture, and so on. Labor in the education sector do not face unemployment. 
The native can be employed or unemployed in the consumption sector and can be 
employed in the education sector. The constitution of the native labor becomes 𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 (8) 
  Using equation from (6) to (8), the number of the educator in period t becomes  𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = (𝟏𝟏 − (𝟏𝟏 − 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬)𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵. (9) 
Substituting equations from (7) to (9) into equation (6), we get the employment rate in 
the consumption sector for the native (the immigrant) in period t  𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝟏𝟏 − (𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝝀𝝀𝒒𝒒𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵𝟏𝟏 + 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬 , (10 − 𝑎𝑎) 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬 . (10 − 𝑏𝑏) 
Using equation (10), the relationship in the employment rate in the consumption sector 
between the native and the immigrant becomes 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − (𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝝀𝝀𝒒𝒒𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵. (11) 
On the other hand, while the native can fully supply one unit of time, the immigrant only 
supply (1 − 𝜌𝜌)  unit of time. Considering the workable time for the native and the 
immigrant, labor forces supplied by the native and the immigrant in the consumption 
sector respectively become 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁  and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = Ρ𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = Ρ𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =𝜆𝜆Ρ𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 . Thus, the total labor force supplied by the native and the immigrant, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 =𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, becomes 𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = �𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸𝟏𝟏 − (𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝝀𝝀𝒒𝒒𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵�𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵, (12) 
where unemployment workers are considered. If all of workers are employed, the total 
labor force supplied by the native and the immigrant becomes 𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭 = (𝟏𝟏 + 𝒖𝒖𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬)�𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸𝟏𝟏 − (𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝝀𝝀𝒒𝒒𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰)𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵� 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵. (13) 
 
2.4 Firms in the consumption sector 
The production function is 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)𝛿𝛿(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇)(1−𝛿𝛿) , where 𝛿𝛿 ∈ (0, 1) . 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
respectively denote the output produced, capital, and labor. The variables attached by the 
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superscript of 𝑇𝑇 are total number of variables.  
   We assume that the wage in the consumption sector at period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿, is set as 𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = 𝝁𝝁𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭,𝝁𝝁 > 𝟏𝟏 (14) 
where 𝜇𝜇 is the mark-up rate, which bring about unemployment workers, and 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 is the 
wage rate when all of workers in the consumption sector are fully employed4.  
   All of capital at the end of each period are assumed to be depreciated in one period. 
According to profit maximization, we have 
 
𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹)(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹 �𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵�−𝜹𝜹 , (15 − 𝑎𝑎) 
𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = 𝜹𝜹(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹−𝟏𝟏 �𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵�𝟏𝟏−𝜹𝜹 (15 − 𝑏𝑏) 
where 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 ≡ 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁, when there are unemployed workers in consumption sector. While the 
native supply whole one unit of time, the immigrant can only Ρ unit of time. Thus, the 
income of the immigrant becomes Ρ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚. 
   On the other hand, we also have solutions according to profit maximization when all 
of workers in the consumption sector are employed: 
𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭 = (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹)(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹 �𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻�−𝜹𝜹 , (16 − 𝑎𝑎) 
𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭 = 𝜹𝜹(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹−𝟏𝟏 �𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑻𝑻�𝟏𝟏−𝜹𝜹 . (16 − 𝑎𝑎) 
   Using equation from ( 14 ) to ( 16 ), the endogenously calculated common 
unemployment rate in consumption sector becomes constant in this model:  
 
4 To effectively, we should take it into consideration the theoretical foundation of why the 
wage rate is set over that under full employment. In this paper, we consider it important to 
pay the relation between the effects of admitting immigrants under considering the school 
burdens and social welfare. Thus, the model is simplified as possible as we can that the 
theoretical foundation is not considered in this paper, which is also one of the serious 
problems left for us to be solved. 
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𝟏𝟏 + 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗ = 𝝁𝝁𝟏𝟏𝜹𝜹 (17) 
According to equation (17), an increase in the mark-up rate raises the unemployment rate. 
We also get the endogenously derived employment rate of the immigrant 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰∗ = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗ = 𝝁𝝁−𝟏𝟏𝜹𝜹. (10 − 𝑏𝑏∗) 
 
 
2.5 The government 
The government endogenously imposes common income tax, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 , on the native and the 
immigrant workers and the unemployment to finance the unemployment benefits, 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋, 
which is set to be  𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝝋𝝋𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭 , (18 − 𝑎𝑎) 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝝋𝝋𝚸𝚸𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑭𝑭 , (19 − b) 
where 𝜑𝜑 is the replacement rate �𝜑𝜑 ∈ (0, 1)�5. Note that the unemployment benefits 
between the native and the immigrant, which implies that the unemployment benefits are 
proportional to the taxes they have to pay for the unemployment benefits. The budget 
constraint on the income tax becomes 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬�𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝚸𝚸𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳𝑬𝑬𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 + 𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒖𝒖𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰�
= 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒃𝒃𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑼𝑼𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 (19) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 is the wage rate of educators.  
   Workers in the consumption sector face the expected income: � 11+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 +� 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸1+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸� 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁  for the native and � 11+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸� Ρ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 + � 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸1+𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸� 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  for the immigrant. Using 
equation (18), the expected incomes become 𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑾𝑾 = 𝜼𝜼∗𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳, (20 − 𝑎𝑎) 𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝜼𝜼∗𝚸𝚸𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳, (20 − 𝑏𝑏) 
where 𝜂𝜂∗ ≡ � 11+𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸∗� �1 + 𝜑𝜑𝜇𝜇 𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸∗�. Some calculation leads to 𝜂𝜂∗ < 1.  
   The government also collects education expense per child, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡, to finance the wage of 
educator, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, which is the same as the expected income in consumption sector:  
 
5 It may be strange that the government imposes income tax on unemployment benefit. However, this 
assumption is for calculation simplicity. In a sense, the income tax on the unemployment benefit just 
implies a decrease in the benefit level. 
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𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒖𝒖 = 𝜼𝜼∗𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳. (21)  
The budget constraint for the education expenses becomes 𝒛𝒛𝒕𝒕(𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰) = 𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒖𝒖𝑯𝑯𝒕𝒕. (22) 
The deterministic wage of educator becomes less than that of an employed worker in 
consumption sector because of 𝜂𝜂∗ < 1. The incomes of educators, 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻, are equal the 
expected incomes in consumption sector: 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻 = 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 = 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁  where 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁  is the 
native common income. We also get the relation: 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = Ρ𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁. 
 
2.6 Individuals 
Individuals live in three periods (child, working and old) and obtain the utility from 
consumption in the last two periods and the number of children. In the child period, they 
spend whole time on schooling but do not consume no goods, which implies behavior in 
the child period do not have impact on their utilities. In the working period, they work 
when employed in consumption sector or education sector or be unemployed in 
consumption sector. Thus, they obtain wages or unemployment benefits. In the old period, 
they consume the savings.  
   The utility function is  𝑼𝑼𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = 𝜶𝜶 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝜷𝜷 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿 + 𝜸𝜸 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (23) 
where 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾 = 1 and 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. The expected budget constraints for native or 
immigrant individuals are 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝒛𝒛𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 + 𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = (𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬)𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (24 − 𝑎𝑎) 𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿 = (𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏)𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿. (24 − 𝑏𝑏) 
Individuals chose the optimal amount of consumption and savings and number of children 
in the working period to maximize the whole utility. Some calculations lead to the optimal 
solutions: 𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = 𝜷𝜷 (𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬)𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (25 − 𝑎𝑎) 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = 𝜸𝜸𝒛𝒛𝒕𝒕 (𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬) 𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (25 − 𝑏𝑏) 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 = 𝜶𝜶 (𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬)𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (25 − 𝑐𝑐) 𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝑿𝑿 = (𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏)𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬) 𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑿𝑿 (25 − 𝑑𝑑) 
Thus, we have following relations in the optimal solutions for the native and the 
immigrant: 𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝚸𝚸𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵, 𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝚸𝚸𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵, 𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝚸𝚸𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 and 𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝚸𝚸𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵.  
 
2.7 Welfare for the native 
By substituting equation (6 ), (7 ), (9 ), (18 ) and (21 ) into equation (19 ), we have the 
following relation between the disposable income rate and the employment rate: 
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𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬 = (𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸)𝜼𝜼∗ − �𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸𝛜𝛜𝐭𝐭𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰∗�𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗(𝟏𝟏 − 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸)𝜼𝜼∗ (26) 
By substituting equation (2), (3), (7), (21) and the relation of 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = Ρ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 into equation 
(22), we have the endogenously derived education expense: 𝒛𝒛𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬∗ = �𝟏𝟏 + 𝒒𝒒𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸 �𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵𝜼𝜼∗𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 (27) 
We can also get the endogenously derived employment rate: 𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵∗ = (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝜼𝜼∗ − 𝜸𝜸𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸𝝐𝝐𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰∗𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗ (28) 
by substituting the equations from (25) to (27) into equation (10). We finally have the 
endogenously derived common disposable income rate and the optimal number of 
children for the native: 𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬∗ = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗ , (29) 
𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵∗ = 𝜸𝜸(𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸)
(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒒𝒒𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸) �𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗� (30) 
by substituting equation (28) into equations (25) and (26). 
   Some calculation leads to the endogenously derived optimal solutions by using the 
equation (20), (25), (29) and (30). We can also get the endogenously derived wage rate 
and the interest rate in period t when there are some unemployed workers: 
𝒘𝒘𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹)(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹� (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)(𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸)𝜼𝜼∗�𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗��
−𝜹𝜹
, (31) 
𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕𝑳𝑳 = 𝜹𝜹(𝒌𝒌𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵)𝜹𝜹−𝟏𝟏� (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)(𝟏𝟏 + 𝝀𝝀𝚸𝚸)𝜼𝜼∗�𝟏𝟏 + (𝟏𝟏 − 𝜸𝜸)𝝋𝝋𝝁𝝁 𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬∗��
𝟏𝟏−𝜹𝜹
. (32) 
   In period t+1, the number of t+1-th generation native is 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼6. 
The relation in the number of children between the native and the immigrant is 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∗ =Ρ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗ . Thus, the number of t+1-th generation is 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝜆𝜆Ρ)𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁. We also have 
 
6 In this paper, we assume that the children of the immigrants can exert their productivity as well as the 
native children and they are assimilated in the host country owing to the additional educators. 
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the amount of capital in the t+1 period: 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝜆𝜆Ρ)𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁. The capital-labor ratio 
in period t+1 is 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡+1𝑇𝑇 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗ which does not depend on the whether the immigrant are 
admitted or not. Thus, there is not any influence caused by admitting immigrants in period 
t after period t+1. 
   We define the social welfare function of the native as  
𝑾𝑾𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝝈𝝈𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏�𝑼𝑼𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵∞𝒕𝒕=𝟎𝟎 (33) 
where 𝜎𝜎 ∈ (0, 1), the discount rate.  
By substituting the endogenously derived optimal solutions and equations (31) and 
(32) into the (23), we get the indirect utility function for the native: 𝑼𝑼𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 = 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 ��𝟏𝟏 − 𝝉𝝉𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬∗�𝑰𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵� + 𝜷𝜷 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥�𝟏𝟏 + 𝒓𝒓𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏𝑳𝑳 � − 𝜸𝜸 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥�𝒛𝒛𝒕𝒕𝑬𝑬∗� + 𝑫𝑫 (34) 
where 𝐷𝐷 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝜶𝜶) + 𝛽𝛽 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝜷𝜷) + 𝜸𝜸𝛼𝛼 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝜸𝜸). 
   By differentiating equation (33) with respect to 𝜆𝜆 and evaluating it with 𝜆𝜆 = 0, we 
get 𝒆𝒆𝑾𝑾𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒆𝒆𝝀𝝀 �𝝀𝝀=𝟎𝟎 = −𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹)𝚸𝚸𝝈𝝈 − (𝟏𝟏 + 𝜸𝜸)(𝟏𝟏 + 𝜹𝜹𝚸𝚸) + 𝜸𝜸(𝒒𝒒 − 𝟏𝟏)𝚸𝚸. (35) 
Thus, we get a proposition: 
 
Proposition  
Admitting immigrants improve the native welfare when the necessary number of 
educators is sufficiently high.  
Proof: 𝒆𝒆𝑾𝑾𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒆𝒆𝝀𝝀 �𝝀𝝀=𝟎𝟎 ><𝟎𝟎 if (𝒒𝒒 − 𝟏𝟏) >< 𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏−𝜹𝜹)𝝈𝝈𝜸𝜸 + (𝟏𝟏+𝜸𝜸)(𝟏𝟏+𝜹𝜹𝚸𝚸)𝜸𝜸𝚸𝚸 .    Q.E.D. 
 
We consider a numerical example by taking the following exogenous parameters(see 
Table 1). The value of 
𝜷𝜷(𝟏𝟏−𝜹𝜹)𝝈𝝈𝜸𝜸 + (𝟏𝟏+𝜸𝜸)(𝟏𝟏+𝜹𝜹𝚸𝚸)𝜸𝜸𝚸𝚸  becomes 3.48. Thus, if 𝑞𝑞(the difference in 
the necessary number of educators between the native and the immigrant) is over 4.48, 
the social welfare of the native improves by admitting immigrants.  
 
Table 1 Exogenous parameters 𝜎𝜎 𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾 𝛿𝛿 𝜌𝜌 
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0.99 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.25 0.05 
 
   We also have following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1 
The unemployment rate of the immigrant becomes lower than that of the native. 
Proof: 
We have 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗, 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∗ and equation (11). Because 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏−�𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵+𝝀𝝀𝒒𝒒𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰�𝒉𝒉𝑵𝑵 
is less than 1, 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁 > 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼∗𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 .       Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2 
The employment rate in the consumption sector become lower by admitting immigrants. 
Proof: 
By differentiating equation (28) with respect to 𝜆𝜆 and evaluating it with 𝜆𝜆 = 0, we get 
𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗�𝜆𝜆=0 = (1−𝛾𝛾)𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡∗1+(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑𝜇𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗ which is higher than 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗ = (1−𝛾𝛾)𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡∗−� 11+𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗�1+(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑𝜇𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸∗ . Thus, the number of 
the employed becomes higher if immigrants are admitted.   Q.E.D. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
We consider the effects of admitting immigrants with the burden of giving schooling to 
the native and the immigrant children. It may sound paradoxical; this model shows 
admitting immigrants may improve the welfare of the native when the necessary number 
of educators the immigrant children need is sufficiently high. What is more, admitting 
immigrants also improves the employment rate of the native. 
   However, in this model, the pension system and accumulation of human capital are 
not considered. So many advanced countries face the serious aging and shrinking 
population problem where the burden of working generation is very heavy because of the 
pension system. It remains to be seen whether admitting immigrant may improve the 
burden of the working generation with the pension system considered or let the native 
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